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Constitutional Restraints on the Doctrine
of Punitive Damages
Theodore B. Olson*
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States held in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.'
that the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment 2 "does not
constrain an award of [punitive] damages in a civil suit when the gov-
ernment neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to re-
ceive a share of the damages awarded." 3 The Court's decision in
Browning-Ferris marked the third time in four years in which the
Court indicated a willingness to address constitutional challenges to
punitive damage awards.4 The Court, however, expressly reserved
for future review the question whether the excessive fines clause
limits punitive damage awards in cases in which the government re-
ceives some part of the award.5 The Court also left for "another day"
the question whether the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment "acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award puni-
* Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C.; LL.B. 1965, University
of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall); B.A. 1962 University of the Pacific. Mr. Olson ar-
gued that punitive damages are unconstitutional in the Supreme Court of the United
States in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986), and Bankers Life and Casu-
alty Co., v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 1971 (1988).
** Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C.; J.D. 1987, University
of San Diego School of Law; B.S. 1984, Arizona State University.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
3. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2914.
4. See also Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying
text.
5. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2920 & n.21.
tive damages in the absence of any express statutory limit."6
The Court's continued interest in the subject of punitive damages
is not surprising. Although imposed in civil cases, punitive damages
are universally recognized as fulfilling purposes traditionally associ-
ated with criminal law: punishment, and through punishment, retri-
bution and deterrence.7 However, although punitive damages "serve
the same function as criminal penalties and are in effect private
fines," 8 in contrast to the imposition of criminal penalties, juries in
civil cases have broad and literally unfettered discretion to determine
whether to impose punitive damages, and if so, in what amounts.
The standards of liability are vague, elastic, and highly subjective,
and yet the vast majority of jurisdictions permits juries to impose un-
limited punitive damages upon a finding of liability.
Since its virtual inception in the United States, the judiciary has
criticized punitive damage awards as a disruptive and distorting com-
ponent of the justice system.9 As one early case stated, "The idea of
punitive damages is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an un-
sightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of
the body of the law."'10 Nonetheless, punitive damages gained accept-
ance and soon flourished in one form or another across the Nation.
Until the last decade or so, however, punitive damages were gener-
ally awarded in relatively modest amounts in traditional tort law
cases involving egregious and intentional misconduct that resulted in
personal injury or death. But in the late 1970s, juries began imposing
punitive damages with increasing frequency, in both escalating
amounts, and within a wide spectrum of cases. Until recently, courts
would have regarded the actionable conduct involved in many of
these cases as outside the realm of tort law and therefore, not subject
to punishment in the form of punitive damages. Today, however, pu-
nitive damages are available in most types of civil cases including li-
bel, products liability, medical malpractice, and commercial disputes
6. Id. at 2921. Four Justices concurred in the Court's opinion specifically on the
grounds that it did not foreclose due process objections to punitive damage awards. Id-
at 2923 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring); Id at 2924 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981)
("Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party,
but rather to punish the tortfeasor ... and to deter him and others from similar ex-
treme conduct."); Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n., 43 Cal. 3d
1379, 1387, 743 P.2d 1323, 1327, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70 (1987) ("Punitive damages ... are
neither equitable nor corrective; punitive damages serve but one purpose-to punish
and through punishment, to deter.").
8. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82-83 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
9. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he doc-
trine of punitive damages has been vigorously criticized throughout the Nation's
history.").
10. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872).
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involving the interpretation of contracts.- Also, "[aiwards of puni-
tive damages are skyrocketing."12
The standardless, open-ended, and arbitrary nature of punitive
damage awards has long been a source of concern to the Supreme
Court of the United States. The Court has most often reviewed puni-
tive damages awards and the manner in which they are imposed in
the context of two types of cases: libel cases raising first amendment
questions and cases interpreting federal statutory provisions that per-
mit punitive damages. However, the focus changed in 1986 in Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie.i3 For the first time in an insurance case in-
volving bad faith claims, the Court recognized that federal constitu-
tional challenges to punitive damages under the due process clause,
the excessive fines clause, the equal protection clause, and the con-
tracts clause "raise[d] important issues which, in an appropriate set-
ting must be resolved."'14 Nevertheless, the Court set aside the award
in Aetna on other grounds15 and did not reach the merits of these
issues.
In May 1988, the Court considered the same issues raised in Aetna
in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw.16 The Court again de-
clined to address the merits of these questions on jurisdictional
grounds.17 However, the Court did not depart from its characteriza-
11. Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit sharply criticized this development in Oki
America, Inc. v. Microtech Int'l., Inc., 872 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1989):
Nowhere but in the Cloud Cuckooland of modern tort theory could a case like
this have been concocted. One large corporation is complaining that another
obstinately refused to acknowledge they had a contract. For this shocking
misconduct it is demanding millions of dollars in punitive damages. I suppose
we will next be seeing lawsuits seeking punitive damages for maliciously re-
fusing to return telephone calls or adopting a condescending tone in interof-
fice memos. Not every slight, nor even every wrong, ought to have a tort
remedy. The intrusion of courts into every aspect of life, and particularly
every type of business relationship, generates serious costs and uncertainties,
trivializes the law, and denies individuals and businesses the autonomy of ad-
justing mutual rights and responsibilities through voluntary contractual
agreement.
Id. at 314-15 (Kozinsky, J., concurring).
12. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909, 2924 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). There has been a decided "trend toward multi-million dollar awards of puni-
tive damages." Id
13. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
14. Id at 828-29.
15. The Court found that judicial bias in the court below had resulted in a viola-
tion of the due process clause. Id at 827-29.
16. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
17. The Court held that the constitutional "claims were not raised and passed
upon in state court." Id at 76. Thereafter, the Court discussed whether the "not
tion of these issues as "important." Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, acknowledged that the excessive fines clause challenge
presented a "question of some moment and difficulty"18 and consid-
ered the issues to be of "'great public importance.' "19 In her concur-
ring opinion in Bankers Life, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Scalia, expressed special interest in the due process challenge to the
unfettered discretion of juries "to impose unlimited punitive damages
on an ad hoc" and subjective basis when she stated: "Bankers Life
has touched on a due process issue that I think is worthy of the
Court's attention in an appropriate case."2 0
The Court returned to the question of the constitutionality of puni-
tive damage awards for the third time in 1988 when it granted certio-
rari in Browning-Ferris. That case presented the question whether a
$6,000,000 punitive damage award was excessive under the eighth
amendment.2 1 This Article examines the Court's decision in Brown-
ing-Ferris and the status of federal constitutional challenges to puni-
tive damages in the aftermath of the decision. After briefly
reviewing the Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence, Section II
provides a critique of the Court's holding that the excessive fines
clause does not apply to punitive damages imposed in purely private
suits. Section III addresses the due process issues left open by the
Court in Browning-Ferris, and Section IV concludes that the punitive
damage system permits arbitrary, standardless, and limitless punish-
ment, thereby "mock[ing] our notions of fundamental fairness em-
bodied in the Due Process Clause."22
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS: BROWNING-FERRIS
INDUSTRIES, INC. V. KELCO DISPOSA, INC.
A. The Court's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
Prior to Browning-Ferris, the Supreme Court's eighth amendment
jurisprudence focused primarily on the cruel and unusual punish-
pressed or passed upon below" rule conclusively precluded appellate jurisdiction. De-
clining to distinguish whether the rule sets a jurisdictional boundary or merely states a
prudential restriction, the Court decided that it was more prudent to decline review of
the constitutional issues. Id. at 79.
18. Id
19. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 224 (1983)).
20. Id. at 87.
21. Petition for a Writ of Cert. to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit at i, Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
109 S. Ct. 527 (1988) (No. 88-556). The Court denied certiorari as to the first question
in the petition, which raised issues under the federal antitrust laws.
22. Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1414, 1415 (5th Cir. 1989) (Jones,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (panel opinion reported at 881 F.2d
1355, petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3038 (U.S. Feb. 13, 1990) (No. 89-1303)).
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ments clause, with an occasional digression for consideration of the
excessive bail clause. On the other hand, the Court has rarely in-
voked the excessive fines clause, and to this day, has not applied the
excessive fines clause to invalidate a monetary punishment in either
a civil or criminal case.
Generally, the Court has limited its eighth amendment analysis of
excessive punishments to capital cases, refusing to evaluate whether
non-capital punishments are constitutionally disproportionate. 23
However, in Solem v. Helm 24 the Court reviewed and invalidated a
sentence of imprisonment, finding it excessive under the cruel and
unusual punishments clause.25 This apparent shift in the Court's phi-
losophy, albeit in a sharply divided five-four decision, suggests at
least the possibility that the Court might be inclined to engage in an
eighth amendment excessiveness analysis of other extreme punish-
ments, including punitive damages pursuant to the excessive fines
clause. Of course, some sort of proportionality review was intended
by the excessive fines clause if the word "excessive" was to have any
meaning. Nonetheless, Solem gave some additional impetus to the
notion that the eighth amendment limited all forms of excessive
punishment.
Another open question in eighth amendment jurisprudence is
whether the excessive fines clause limits punishments in civil as well
as criminal cases. In the 1977 case of Ingraham v. Wright,26 the
Court held that corporal punishment of school children did not con-
stitute the kind of punishment limited by the cruel and unusual pun-
ishments clause because that clause was concerned only with
punishments imposed as a consequence of a criminal proceeding.
Nonetheless, the Court noted in Ingraham that "[s]ome punishments,
though not labeled criminal by the State, may be sufficiently analo-
gous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in which they are
administered to justify application of the Eighth Amendment."27 Be-
cause the Ingraham Court seemed to leave the door open for applica-
tion of the eighth amendment to non-criminal punishments which,
23. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
24. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
25. Id. at 295-303. On November 5, 1990, the Court heard argument in a case that
presents the question whether a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole for possession of cocaine violates the cruel and unusual punishments clause.
Harmelin v. Michigan, No. 89-7272 (U.S. argued Nov. 5, 1990).
26. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
27. Id at 669 n.37. See also id. at 685 (White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
like punitive damages, serve criminal law purposes, and because In-
graham did not involve application of the excessive fines clause, the
case did not, on its face, foreclose an eighth amendment challenge to
punitive damages. Moreover, the Court had previously assumed that
the excessive bail clause is applicable to civil cases,2 8 indicating that
the principles of the eighth amendment are not confined to criminal
cases.
In determining the scope of the eighth amendment, the Court has
looked primarily to the Framers' original intent in adopting the
amendment. In particular, the Court has placed great weight on the
Framers' familiarity with and reliance upon the English antecedents
of the eighth amendment: chapter twenty of Magna Carta and clause
ten of the English Bill of Rights of 1689.n
B. The Court's Decision of the Excessive Fines Clause Question In
Browning-Ferris
Browning-Ferris involved a commercial dispute between two com-
petitors in the waste collection business in Vermont. Kelco brought a
federal antitrust treble damage action and a pendent state tort suit
for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that Browning-Fer-
ris had attempted to drive Kelco out of business through predatory
pricing. Convinced by Kelco's lawyer to "deliver a message" to
Browning-Ferris' headquarters in Houston, the jury returned a ver-
dict of $51,146 in compensatory damages and $6,000,000 in punitive
damages.30 The Second Circuit affirmed the $6,000,000 punitive dam-
age award, holding that even if the excessive fines clause applied, the
punitive damage award was not so disproportionate as to be " 'consti-
tutionally excessive.' "31
In the Supreme Court, Browning-Ferris contended that punitive
damage awards imposed in civil cases to punish and deter are "fines"
under the excessive fines clause. Browning-Ferris also argued that it
was immaterial that punitive damages are imposed in civil cases be-
cause they serve the same purpose as fines do in criminal cases.
Therefore, punitive damages are "penal" sanctions subject to the ex-
cessive fines clause, regardless of the fact that they are imposed in
civil suits. According to Browning-Ferris, the history of the excessive
fines clause, including practices under both Magna Carta and the
28. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544-46 (1952) (on review of habeas
corpus proceeding).
29. See, e.g., Solem, 463 U.S. at 284-86.
30. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909, 2913 (1989).
31. 1& (quoting Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc.,
845 F.2d 404, 410 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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English Bill of Rights of 1689, supported this interpretation.3 2
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, rejected
each of these contentions. Based upon the Framers' use of the word
"fines" in the excessive fines clause, the Court concluded that the
clause is inapplicable to an award of punitive damages.3 3 The word
"fine," the Court explained, "was understood [by the Framers] to
mean payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offence. Then,
as now, fines were assessed in criminal rather than in private civil
actions."34
The Court rejected Browning-Ferris' reading of the historical ori-
gins of the excessive fines clause.35 The Court concluded that the
historical purpose of the excessive fines clause and its English fore-
runners-Magna Carta's "amercements" clauses and the excessive
fines provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689-was to limit the
sovereign's ability "to use its prosecutorial power, including the
power to collect fines, for improper ends."36 Thus, the Court rea-
soned "that the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only
those fines directly imposed by and payable to, the government,"3 7
and that therefore, the clause did not apply to punitive damages
awarded to private parties.38
The Court also considered whether "new conditions and pur-
poses"3 9 required application of the eighth amendment to punitive
damage awards even though, in the Court's view, the Framers "did
not expressly intend it to apply."40 Although punitive damage
awards "received their first reported American [judicial] endorse-
ment in 1791-the year of the Eighth Amendment's ratification,"41
the Court suggested that punitive damages had "solid grounding in
pre-Revolutionary days." 42 The Court relied upon the fact that Eng-
lish statutes had provided for double and triple "damages" as early as
the thirteenth century, and that English courts had first recognized
32. Brief for the Petitioners at 13-21, Browning-Ferris (No. 88-556).
33. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2915.
34. 1& (footnote omitted). However, the Court noted that there was no direct evi-
dence of "the term 'fines' or whether the prohibition [of the excessive fines clause] had
any application in the civil context." Id,
35. 1& at 2914 n.4, 2917.
36. Id at 2916, 2918.
37. Id at 2916 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2919 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
40. I&
41. Brief for Respondents at 20, Browning-Ferris (No. 88-556).
42. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2919.
"exemplary" damages in 1763.43 Because punitive damages are not a
"strictly modern creation,"4 the Court refused to apply the eighth
amendment beyond the scope of its perceived original meaning.
The Court agreed that punitive damage awards, like criminal law,
"advance the interests of punishment and deterrence."45 However,
the Court rejected the argument that the penal nature of punitive
damages was sufficient to distinguish them from ordinary civil dam-
ages, which compensate the plaintiff for injuries suffered. The Court
explained that because private plaintiffs prosecute the action and col-
lect the monetary punishment, punitive damage awards are "too far
afield from the concerns that animate the eighth amendment."46
Therefore, the Court refused to apply the excessive fines clause to
limit exorbitant punitive damage awards.47
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented from the
Court's excessive fines clause holding. In her view, the Court's con-
clusion that the excessive fines clause does not apply to suits between
private parties is "neither compelled by history nor supported by
precedent." 48
C The Court's Historical Analysis
The majority's determination that the excessive fines clause does
not apply to monetary awards made to private plaintiffs, as opposed
to those made to governmental entities, overlooks the fact that the
identity of the recipient of the fiscal punishment imposed "through
the aegis of courts"4 9 was never of dispositive significance in deter-
mining the limits on governmental punishments prior to the eighth
amendment.
1. The Origins of the Excessive Fines Clause
The Court recognized in Browning-Ferris that "the Eighth Amend-
ment was 'based directly on Art. I, § 9, of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights,' which 'adopted verbatim the language of the English Bill of
Rights.'"50 Clause ten of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, like the
eighth amendment, expressly prohibits the imposition of "excessive
Fines."51 In turn, the excessive fines provision of the English Bill of
43. Id. at 2919-20.
44. Id. at 2919.
45. Id. at 2920.
46. Id at 2920-21.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
49. Id. at 2920.
50. Id. at 2916 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.10 (1983)).
51, Clause 10 provides that: "'excessive Bail ought not be required nor excessive
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Rights can be traced directly to chapter twenty of 1215, which prohib-
ited monetary punishments, referred to as "amercements" at the
time, "that were disproportionate to the offense or that would de-
prive the wrongdoer of his means of livelihood."52 This concept of
proportionality was "repeated" in clause ten of the English Bill of
Rights of 1689, written into many colonial charters, and finally incor-
porated within the eighth amendment.53
The Court in Browning-Ferris agreed that the Framers intended
the eighth amendment "to provide at least the same protection-in-
cluding the right to be free from excessive punishments"--as had
been afforded under English law.54 Nevertheless, the Court rejected
the proposition that punitive damages are analogous to the kinds of
monetary punishments that were limited by Magna Carta and the
English Bill of Rights prior to ratification of the eighth amend-
ment.55 However, the Court did not engage in a detailed, chronologi-
cal analysis of the historical development of monetary punishments
under English law that led to the emergence of punitive damages.
Such an analysis demonstrates that modern punitive damages would
have been regarded by the Framers as precisely the kind of monetary
punishment subject to the constraints of the excessive fines clause.
2. The Evolution of Pecuniary Punishments
Prior to the Norman Conquest of 1066, there was no distinction be-
tween civil and criminal law; a single system which recognized a class
of "wrongs" combined the dual objectives of compensating the victim
and punishing the wrongdoer. The victim of a "wrong" could secure
financial compensation from the perpetrator of the offense as an al-
ternative to vengeance through retaliation or "bloodfeud."56 Such
compensatory sums, known as "wers" or "bots," were imposed
against the wrongdoer and awarded to the victim. 5 7 Additionally, a
further payment, known as a "wite," was exacted from the wrong-
doer "as a sum[ ] due to the community, on the ground that every evil
Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted.'" Id (quoting 1 W. & M.,
ch. 2, 3 Stat. 440, 441 (1869)).
52. 1I at 2927 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
53. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-86.
54. Id at 286.
55. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2916.
56. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 499-50 (2d
ed. 1898).
57. 1d. at 451.
deed inflicts a wrong on society in general, as well as upon its vic-
tim."5 8 Centuries later, this theory remains the fundamental justifi-
cation for the imposition of punitive damages.
After the Norman Conquest, this system was succeeded "by a sys-
tem, or lack of a system, by which the convicted party was 'in the
King's mercy.' "59 Under this regime, the wrongdoer's life, limbs, and
possessions were put at the King's mercy; the peace was thereafter
restored by compensating the victim for his losses, as well as paying
the Crown a sum, known as an "amercement," to punish the wrong-
doer for the offense against the public.60
Over time, the amercement system was recognized by the Crown
as an important and lucrative source of revenue. This recognition led
to the infliction of increasingly larger amercements. During the
reign of King John, these monetary penalties were converted into
"instruments of extortion,"61 which became a major force behind the
presentation of Magna Carta by the barons to King John on June 15,
1215.
As noted above, chapter twenty of Magna Carta mandated that an
amercement be "in accordance with the degree of the offense." 62
This concept of proportionality expressed a relationship between the
amercement and the "wrong done to the lord or the court, and not
the other party to litigation."6 3 In the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies, imprisonment first emerged as a form of punishment, and
"fines" were "voluntary offerings made to the King to obtain some
favor or to escape punishment."64 An amercement, in sharp contrast,
58. W. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 285 (2d ed. 1914). According to McKechnie,
the size of wers and wites was often determined by various codes. Id,
59. J. JOLLIFEE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 225 (4th
ed. 1961).
60. W. McKEcHNIE, supra note 58, at 285-86. This payment to the Crown was
based on the theory "that offences against the established order were offences also
against the King." I& at 80.
61. 1di at 22.
62. Chapter 20 of Magna Carta reads as follows:
A freeman shall not be amerced for a slight offence, except in accordance
with the degree of the offence; and for a grave offence he shall be amerced in
accordance with the gravity of the offence, yet saving always his "contene-
ment"; and a merchant in the same way, saving his "merchandise"; and a vil-
lein shall be amerced in the same way, saving his "wainage"-if they have
fallen into our mercy: and none of the aforesaid amercements shall be im-
posed except by the oath of honest men of the neighborhood.
Id. at 284. In addition, courts had the power to pardon amercements altogether; usu-
ally this power was exercised on the basis of the "poverty" of the person amerced. See
id. at 288.
63. See Novae Narrationes, 80 SELDEN SOC. cci (E. Shanks ed. 1963). The amerce-
ment clauses were popularly regarded as among the most important provisions of
Magna Carta. "Very likely there was no clause in Magna Carta more grateful to the
mass of the people than that about amercements." F. MAITLAND, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN FOR THE COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER XXXIV (1884).
64. W. McKECHNIE, supra note 58, at 293.
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was itseUf a monetary punishment. By the seventeenth century, how-
ever, the word "fine" took on its more modern meaning; the terms
"fine" and "amercement" were used interchangeably, 65 and it was as-
sumed that Magna Carta's amercements clauses applied to both, until
the word amercement gradually fell into disuse.66
The amercements clauses and Magna Carta's principle of propor-
tionality applied to civil and criminal wrongs alike. Blackstone ex-
pressly recognized that amercements had historically been imposed
as civil punishments regulated by the amercements clauses of Magna
Carta in the same fashion as fines had come to be regulated in crimi-
nal cases after the separation of criminal and tort law in England had
begun:
The reasonableness of fines in criminal cases has also been usually regu-
lated by the determination of Magna Carta, concerning amercements for mis-
behavior in matters of civil right.6 7
The practice of imposing punitive or "exemplary" damages began
in the mid-eighteenth century in England in Huckle v. Money.68
These awards, like amercements, were based upon the egregiousness
of the wrong to the public, not the harm done to the plaintiff, and
served to inflict "punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such
proceeding for the future, and as proof of the detestation of the jury
to the action itself."69 Initially, the English courts confused the ra-
tionale for imposing punitive damages, sometimes deeming them
compensation for "intangible injuries,"70 such as injury to reputation.
However, by the nineteenth century the compensatory damage com-
ponent had expanded to permit damages for these injuries. Punitive
damages were imposed in civil cases solely for the purpose of punish-
ment to redress the injury to society or the "public wrong" compo-
65. See Griesly's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 530 (C.P. 1588). Another form of "penal"
sanction developed in the fourteenth century-qui tam actions-could be prosecuted
in either civil or criminal actions by aggrieved parties or "common informers," who
had suffered no personal injury. These private prosecutors divided the penalty with
the Crown. See generally Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH.
U.L.Q. 81, 83-91. As with the practice of assessing amercements, the qui tam practice
proliferated, was abused, and then was reformed. Qui tam actions were abolished in
England by statute in 1951. Id at 88. They still exist today, however, in the United
States, and the Court in Browning-Ferris left open the issue whether the excessive
fines clause applies to qui tam awards. Browning Ferris Indus. of Vermont Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2920 n.21 (1989).
66. W. McKECHNIE, supra note 58, at 293.
67. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
68. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
69. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763).
70. See, e.g., Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (C.P. 1769).
nent of the defendant's conduct, while compensatory damages were
awarded to redress private injuries.
The American punitive damage law developed in a similar fashion.
It appears that the first imposition of punitive damages in the United
States occurred in 1791.71 The early cases sometimes announced a
dual compensatory and punitive justification for exemplary damage
awards.72 This gave way in the last half of the nineteenth century to
a purely punitive rationale as the concept of actual damages ex-
panded to include elements of intangible injury.7 3
This historical background demonstrates that punitive damages are
the modern equivalent of, and directly descended from, wites,
amercements, and fines. Like these punishments, punitive damages
are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence by a system
which simultaneously compensates the victim for his injury, and pun-
ishes the defendant for the wrong done to society by his conduct.
The modem punitive damage system mirrors the English system,
which joined the reparative and punitive functions of the law subject
to the amercement clauses of the Magna Carta and later, the English
Bill of Rights of 1689, except in one respect: punitive damages are
paid to the plaintiff rather than to the State.
The Court in Browning-Ferris inferred from this distinction that
the excessive fines clause and its English counterparts were intended
to limit only monetary punishments that are paid into government
coffers. The Court could have easily found that these provisions had
a broader purpose: to prevent excessive monetary punishments im-
posed through governmentally sponsored systems for the societal
purposes of retribution and deterrence.
The Court relied upon little more than the fact that, at the time
the eighth amendment was adopted, fines were imposed in criminal
cases that were prosecuted by public officials, and "damages" were
imposed in civil cases that were prosecuted by private plaintiffs. But
such an approach failed to take into account the intricate historical
evolution of pecuniary punishments discussed above: initially, mone-
tary punishments were imposed in systems that did not distinguish
between civil and criminal cases, and in which private parties prose-
cuted all actions. Later, monetary punishments became a facet in
71. See Brief for Respondents at 20, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989) (No. 88-556).
72. See, e.g., McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 432, 436 (1845).
73. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 384 (1872); Hawk v. Ridgeway, 33 Ill. 473,
475 (1864). See also W. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 303 (2d. ed. 1912)
(in the late nineteenth century, the punitive damage doctrine was "well characterized
as 'a sort of hybrid between a display of ethical indignation and the imposition of a
criminal fine' ").
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both civil and criminal law once the division between the civil and
criminal justice systems had begun.
The Court also found it significant that "English case law, immedi-
ately prior to the enactment of the English Bill of Rights, .. . stressed
the difference between civil damages and criminal fines."74 But this
case law predated the advent of punitive damages, which were not
recognized under English law until 1763. It is not surprising that
English cases in the seventeenth century distinguished between "civil
damages"-which at the time were only awarded to compensate-and
criminal fines-which were imposed to punish and deter.75 However,
this hardly sheds light on the question whether the Framers would
have viewed punitive "damages," which today serve only to punish,
as a monetary punishment subject to the excessive fines clause.
The Court's reliance on the fact that English courts did not invoke
Magna Carta or the English Bill of Rights to explain the reduction of
excessive civil damage awards in cases decided before the ratification
of the eighth amendment in 179176 is similarly misplaced. Absent
recognition of the purely punitive purposes of "exemplary" damages,
which had not yet occurred in England, the historical link between
amercements, fines, and punitive damages would not have been clear.
Consequently, English courts of the late 1700s could not have been
expected to invalidate such "exemplary" damage awards based upon
"constitutional" principles prohibiting excessive monetary
punishments.
The Court also explained its holding in Browning-Ferris on the
ground that modern English cases do not apply Magna Carta or the
English Bill of Rights to restrain punitive damages. 77 However, the
74. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2916 (citing Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng.
Rep. 994 (C.P. 1677)).
75. Relying upon eighteenth and nineteenth century treatise definitions of the
words "fine" and "damages," the Court purported to discover a historical "dichotomy"
between fines and punitive damages that was "clear." Id. at 2915 & nn.6-7. However,
the Court quoted definitions of "damages" that served a compensatory, not punitive,
function. See, e.g., id. at 2915 n.7 (" '[Damages] comprehend a recompense for what the
plaintiff . . . hath suffered, by means of the wrong done to him by the defendant
....') (citation omitted). Moreover, the definitions of the word "fine" offered by the
Court said nothing about who was entitled to receive payment of a "fine," but rather
simply described "'a percuniarie punishment for an offence... committed against the
king.'" Id. at 2915 n.6 (citation omitted). Of course, this definition of a "fine" could
easily be viewed as describing modern day punitive damages, which are monetary pun-
ishments imposed for civil "offenses" against the public.
76. I& at 2919.
77. Id. at 2919 n.18.
modern English practice cannot be an illuminating source for the in-
tentions of the Framers of the eighth amendment in 1789.
D. The Court's Precedents
The Court's own descriptions and applications of the doctrine of
punitive damages in previous cases directly undercut its rationale in
Browning-Ferris. The Court itself has often referred to punitive
damage awards as "fines." For example, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,78 the Court characterized punitive damages as "private fines
levied by civil juries."7 9  Similarly, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp.,80 Justice Blackmun referred to a $10,000,000 punitive damage
award as a "jury fine,"81 and a "substantial penalt[y]."8 2 Justice Mar-
shall also has observed that punitive damages "serve the same func-
tion as criminal penalties and are in effect private fines."8 3 Chief
Justice Rehnquist has deemed punitive damages "fine[s] . .. [which]
should go to the State."8 4 And "[tihe Court's cases abound with the
recognition of the penal nature of punitive damages."8 5
Indeed, in Browning-Ferris, the Court "agree[d] ... that punitive
damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence, which
are also among the interests advanced by the criminal law."86 And,
as the Court stated in 1885 in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
78. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
79. Id. at 350.
80. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
81. Id. at 265 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 259. See also id. at 262 (the trial court instructed the "jury to fashion a
fine").
83. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82-83 (1971) (Marshall J., joined
by Stewart, J., dissenting).
84. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Powell, J., dissenting). State court judges have similarly equated punitive dam-
ages with fines. See, e.g., Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 759,
168 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1980) (Elkington, J., concurring) (citations omitted) ("[The plain-
tiff having no right to punitive damages, the award has the nature of a public fine im-
posed to punish and deter evil intent and acts. It becomes logically indistinguishable
from the fine imposed as punishment for a misdemeanor... or for a felony.").
85. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909, 2932 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). While a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Justice Ken-
nedy referred to punitive damages as "a hybrid of the civil and criminal law," and ob-
served that plaintiffs seeking punitive damages
act as private attorneys general to effect ... deterrence and retribution func-
tions .... So far is this opportunity from being a fundamental personal right
that it is an interest not truly personal in nature at all. It is, rather a public
interest, and in defining who may give it effect the legislature should be given
broad discretion, similar to the discretion of a prosecutor.
In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1319-20, 1322 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted),
cert denied sub nora. Kalinsky v. General Dynamics Corp., 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
86. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2920.
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Humes, 8 7
[t]he additional damages being by way of punishment .... it is not a valid ob-
jection that the sufferer instead of the State receives them .... The power of
the State to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its statutory require-
ments is coeval with government; and the mode in which they shall be en-
forced, whether at the suit of a private party, or at the suit of the public, and
what disposition shall be made by the amounts collected, are merely matters
of legislative discretion. 88
Moreover, the Court's emphasis on the fact that the government
did not receive the fruits of its civil punishment scheme in Browning-
Ferris is squarely inconsistent with its decisions in other cases involv-
ing application of the Bill of Rights to actions between private par-
ties. For example, although the first amendment was clearly
intended to protect against governmental suppression of free expres-
sion, the Court has long recognized that the first amendment re-
stricts private recovery of both punitive and compensatory damages
in cases of libel and slander.89
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,90 the Court held that the first
amendment prohibited recovery of punitive damages for libel absent
a showing of actual malice. Although a subsequent decision indicated
that the Gertz restriction on punitive damages does not apply when
the speech in question involves matters of a purely private concern, 9 1
Gertz continues to limit the award of punitive damages for speech on
matters of public concern. Just as large damage awards threaten the
values protected by the first amendment, excessive punitive damages
threaten the values sought to be protected by the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition of excessive fines.
There is no logical reason why the Court's justification for the in-
applicability of the eighth amendment to punitive damages would not
apply with equal force to the first amendment. For example, the
Court assumes that "civil damages" present none of the historical
concerns about the abuse of governmental power that led to the
87. 115 U.S. 512 (1885). Humes involved a statute that allowed private plaintiffs to
recover double damages.
88. Id. at 522-23.
89. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
90. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
91. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-
63 (1985) (non-media defamation of a private individual). Justice White, in a separate
concurrence in Dun & Bradstreet, urged the Court to consider abandoning restrictions
on the common-law standard of liability for libel and instead focus on limiting or
prohibiting presumed and punitive damages. Id. at 772-74 (White, J., concurring).
adoption of the eighth amendment. Even if true,92 the same could be
said of punitive damages and the first amendment. Similarly, the
Court's rationale in Browning-Ferris seems to suggest that a jury's
assessment of liability and damages against private parties in com-
mon law actions is somehow not state action for purposes of the Bill
of Rights. Given the general incorporation of the Bill of Rights, such
a suggestion is untenable. As the Court's first amendment cases
demonstrate, common law recoveries are now subject to scrutiny
under the protections contained in the Bill of Rights.93
E. Issues Left Open In Browning-Ferris
Based upon the distinction between monetary punishments paid to
private parties and those awarded to the government, the Court in
Browning-Ferris reserved for future review the issue whether puni-
tive damage awards imposed in civil cases and collected by the gov-
ernment, or by private parties who share some part of the award
with the government (for example, qui tam actions), are constrained
by the excessive fines clause.94 Justice O'Connor observed that "by
relying so heavily on the distinction between governmental involve-
ment and purely private suits, the Court suggests (despite its claim
... that it leaves the question open) that the Excessive Fines Clause
will place some limits on awards of punitive damages that are recov-
ered by a governmental entity."95
The principal issue left undecided by the Court in Browning-Ferris
was the impact of the due process clause on punitive damages. In its
brief on the merits,96 Browning-Ferris argued that the $6,000,000 pu-
nitive damage award imposed against it was an excessive and funda-
mentally unfair punishment that violated the due process clause.
92. Although punitive damages were not yet generally recognized when the eighth
amendment was adopted, and thus could not have been a specific concern of the Fram-
ers or of those who ratified that amendment, the entire history of pecuniary punish-
ments in England demonstrates that the common law antecedents of punitive
damages-fines and amercements-were precisely the kinds of abuses of governmental
power that led to the adoption of the prototypes of the eighth amendment's excessive
fine clause in Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights.
93. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988) (in which the
Court unanimously held that common law recovery for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress is subject to first amendment restrictions).
94. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909, 2920 n.21 (1989).
95. Id. at 2932-33 (O'Connor J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2) (b)(1987)). The Florida statute cited by
Justice O'Connor, like a number of other recently enacted provisions, requires that
some portion of punitive damage awards be paid to the State. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (2) (Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (Vernon 1988); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.540 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (Supp. 1989).
96. Brief for the Petitioners at 8, Browning-Ferris (No. 88-556).
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However, the Court declined to consider Browning-Ferris' due pro-
cess challenge because it had not been raised in the courts below or
in the certiorari petition. Nonetheless, while not deciding the issue,
the Court recognized that "[t]here is some authority in our opinions
for the view that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the
size of a civil damages award made pursuant to a statutory scheme," 97
and reserved for "another day" the "precise question... whether due
process acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive
damages in the absence of any express statutory limit."98
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the
Court's opinion expressly "on the understanding that it leaves the
door open for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the
imposition of punitive damages in civil cases brought by private par-
ties"99 and suggested that the Court's scrutiny "of awards made with-
out the benefit of a legislature's deliberation and guidance would be
less indulgent than [it's] consideration of those that fall within statu-
tory limits."100 Justice O'Connor agreed "that nothing in the Court's
opinion forecloses a due process challenge to awards of punitive dam-
ages or the method by which they are imposed"101 and explicitly ad-
hered to her comments in her concurring opinion in Bankers Life &
Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,102 in which Justice Scalia joined, "regard-
ing the vagueness and procedural due process problems presented by
juries given unbridled discretion to impose punitive damages."' 0 3
These due process issues are discussed in the following section.
III. UNDUE DISCRETION AND DUE PROCESS
In 1986 in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,10 4 the Court recognized
that the "lack of sufficient standards governing punitive damages
awards" raised serious and substantial questions under the due pro-
cess clause.lO5 Two years later, in Bankers Life, Justice O'Connor ob-
97. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2921 (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & South-
ern Railway Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919)).
98. Id. at 2921 (citing Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 79-80
(1988) (O'Connor, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring)).
99. 1& at 2923 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. Id, at 2924 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
102. 486 U.S. 71 (1988). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
103. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
104. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
105. Id. at 828-29.
served that the punitive damage doctrine "gives juries discretion to
award any amount of punitive damages in any tort case in which a
defendant acts with a certain mental state .... [B]ecause of the puni-
tive character of such awards, there is reason to think that this may
violate the Due Process Clause."'106 As noted above, the various opin-
ions in Browning-Ferris express similar concerns regarding the lack
of meaningful legislative standards or limits constraining the award
of punitive damages.
This "standardless discretion" of juries to impose punitive damages
in "completely indeterminate" 0 7 amounts is a feature common to
most state punitive damage regimes. Although numerous states re-
cently have enacted "tort reform" measures that contain provisions
relating to punitive damages, these provisions have done little to ad-
dress the constitutional problems that were identified in Aetna,
Bankers Life, and Browning-Ferris.
Of the nine states that have enacted statutory limits on the size of
punitive damages, only one, Virginia,'0 8 has established a precise
maximum dollar amount in all cases. Of the remaining punitive
damage "caps," some statutes establish post hoc "limits" on the size of
the award by relating the punitive damage award to either the de-
fendant's wealth or the amount of the compensatory award.' 09 How-
ever, neither of these methods provide individuals with advance
notice of the amount of punishment that may be inflicted, and other
methods are so riddled with exceptions that they are rendered virtu-
ally meaningless.110 Similarly, legislative attempts to limit or define
more precisely the conduct that may give rise to punitive damage lia-
bility have resulted in standards that remain far from precise. For
example, in 1987 the California Legislature amended its statutory
standards to require that conduct be "despicable" as well as "mali-
cious" and "oppressive" to support an award of punitive damages.1"'
Such legislation simply adds new and highly subjective terms to al-
ready vague and subjective standards and does not provide sufficient
notice to defendants of the conduct that might subject them to
punishment.112
106. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 87 (O'Connor, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 88.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1989).
109. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987) (limiting punitive damages to the
amount of compensatory award, or three times that amount if misconduct continues
during trial); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(e) (Supp. 1989) (limiting punitive award to
the lesser of the defendant's gross annual income during the five-year period preceding
the misconduct, or $5,000,000).
110. See e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (1987) (exempting bad faith, product liability,
defamation, and "toxic tort" actions from punitive damage limits).
111. CAL CIv. CODE § 3294(c) (Deering Supp. 1990).
112. In contrast, some states have used tort "reform" to expand the right to recover
unlimited punitive damages. See, e.g., PA. H.B. 121, § 3, amending PA. CODE ch. 83, tit.
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The lower federal and state courts have also declined to address
and resolve the due process problems of unlimited and excessive pu-
nitive damage awards, uniformly refusing to apply federal constitu-
tional principles to the otherwise unfettered discretion of juries to
inflict punitive damages, absent a Supreme Court directive to do
so. 1 13 In short, in most American jurisdictions today, individuals can
be singled out by civil juries for unpredictable, capricious, and virtu-
ally unlimited punitive damage awards based upon violation of a pot-
pourri of vague, elastic, and amorphous standards.
Juries are generally permitted to exercise freewheeling judgment
as to whether punitive damages are appropriate in a given case. Stat-
utes and jury instructions usually enumerate a wide range of subjec-
tive terms to describe the kind of conduct that will support punitive
damages, including: "reprehensible," "mere caprice," "wanton," "neg-
ligence," "bad faith," "oppression, fraud, or malice," "rudeness," and
"willful indifference to the rights and safety of others."" 4 These
terms can be applied, in a jury's discretion, to virtually any conduct
that may constitute a wrong in our legal system.
In Giacco v. Pennsylvania,"5 the Supreme Court rejected the
same kind of "loose and unlimiting" terms as a basis for imposing
punishment."x 6 In Giacco, the Court held that a state statute that
empowered a jury to impose costs upon an acquitted defendant vio-
lated the due process clause." 7 State court interpretations of the
statute indicated that a jury could impose costs under "the statute if
the defendant's conduct was 'reprehensible in some respect,' 'im-
proper' [or] outrageous to 'morality and justice.' ,1,8 However, the
Court found that these terms did not remedy the deficiencies of the
statute because the jury still had "such broad and unlimited power in
imposing costs ... that the jurors must make determinations of the
42 (signed Feb. 7, 1990) (creating a cause of action for '"ad faith" against insurers with-
out defining what constitutes "bad faith" conduct and authorizing unlimited punitive
damages in such actions).
113. See, e.g., Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1989) (determin-
ing that the constitutionality of punitive damages is '%est left for Congress or for
higher judicial authority"); Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Smith, 79 Md. App. 591, 558
A.2d 768, 790-92 (1989) (noting Supreme Court's "approval" of the punitive damage sys-
tem in 1851 and stating, "[w]hat the Supreme Court has declared constitutional we
may not put asunder") (affirming $7,500,000 punitive damage award), rev. denied, 317
Md. 393, 564 A.2d 407 (1989).
114. See generally L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES (2d ed. 1989).
115. 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
116. Id at 403-04.
117. Id. at 402.
118. Id. at 403-04.
crucial issue upon their own notions of what the law should be in-
stead of what it is."119 The Court stated:
[O]ne of the basic purposes of the Due Process Clause has always been to pro-
tect a person against having the Government impose burdens upon him except
in accordance with... valid laws ... that [carry] an understandable meaning
with legal standards that courts must enforce. This state Act as written does
not even begin to meet this constitutional requirement.
12 0
The Giacco Court added that "whether labeled 'penal' or not [such a
provision] must meet the challenge that it is unconstitutionally
vague."121
The Court has not yet had an occasion to apply these due process
standards to the "vagueness problems"122 posed by the state punitive
damage systems flourishing throughout the United States. But those
systems inflict the very same deprivations of property through the
imposition of punishment by civil juries under "ill-defined"123 stan-
dards that fail to provide meaningful notice to defendants of the cir-
cumstances that may subject them to monetary punishment. If it is
unconstitutional to extract a $230 penalty for "reprehensible" con-
duct as it was in Giacco, it cannot conceivably be constitutional to ex-
tract multi-million dollar penalties for conduct that is "despicable" or
"wanton."
Punitive damages are often retrospectively assessed in cases in
which a new standard of conduct has been formulated and an-
nounced for the first time.124 The evolving common law of torts is
often "a predator lurking in the shadows to pounce on the unsuspect-
ing" with extreme and unjustified monetary punishment.125 While it
may not in the long run be unreasonable to require a person to pay
damages for the consequences of his actions even under a new stan-
dard of liability, the imposition of a penalty for deviating from a pre-
viously unrecognized standard is another matter. The Court in other
contexts has stated that it "would ... hesitate to approve the retro-
spective imposition of liability on any theory of deterrence . . . or
119. Id. at 403.
120. Id.
121. Id at 402.
122. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909, 2924 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
123. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 780 n.4 (1985)
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). See also
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59-65 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
Powell, J., dissenting) (recognizing the vague, overlapping nature of punitive damage
liability standards).
124. See, e.g., Hodder v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn.
1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3265 (1989). See also Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.,
881 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3038 (U.S. Feb. 13,
1990) (No. 89-1303).
125. Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1414, 1420 (5th Cir. 1990) (Jones,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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blameworthiness,"126 and it has been swift to apply the due process
clause to prohibit judicial enlargement of obligations imposed by the
criminal law.127
The amount of the allowable punishment in punitive damage cases
is similarly unconstrained by any fixed standards or limitations. 28
The determination of how large the punitive damage award should
be in a given case is generally "peculiarly left to the discretion of the
jury as the degree of punishment to be inflicted must always be de-
pendent on the circumstances of each case, as well as upon the
demonstrated degree of malice, wantonness, oppression, or outrage
found by the jury from the evidence."129 Moreover, the general soci-
etal purposes of punishment-retribution and deterrence-which are
not routinely invoked in punitive damage statutes and jury instruc-
tions, do not provide any meaningful restriction on the discretion of
the jury to administer punishment. These purposes themselves "pos-
sess inadequate self-limiting principles"'13 0 and do not constitute "dis-
cernible limits," but rather allow juries to assess punitive damages
"in almost any amount."'131
In most jurisdictions, "juries are left largely to themselves in mak-
ing this important, and potentially devastating, decision."'132 As Jus-
tice Brennan accurately observed in Browning-Ferris, in cases in
which no statutory (or common law) standards regarding the appro-
priate level of maximum punishment exist, "punitive damages are
imposed by juries guided by little more than an admonition to do
126. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976) (citations
omitted). Such claims are also cognizable under the contracts clause, article I, section
10, clause 1, in cases involving the interpretation of a contract, such as bad faith insur-
ance cases. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986) (a claim that the
"retrospective imposition of punitive damages under a new [judicially created] cause of
action violates ... the Contracts Clause ... raise[s] [an] important issue").
127. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
128. "Upon deciding to grant punitive damage[s], little if any guidance is given the
jury as to the appropriate size of the award." Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890,
902, 598 P.2d 854, 861, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 701 (1979) (Clark, J., dissenting).
129. Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 327, 171 So. 214, 221-22
(1936).
130. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 180 (1987) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
131. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82-83 (1971) (Marshall, J., joined
by Stewart, J., dissenting).
132. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909, 2923 (1989) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring). One jury even re-
turned a "punitive damage" verdict that sentenced the defendant to one to five years
imprisonment. Arnett v. Fuston, 53 Tenn. App. 24, 378 S.W.2d 425 (1963) (affirming
trial court's decision to discard the prison sentence as surplusage).
what they think is best."3 3
The Supreme Court has expressed serious concerns about the con-
sequences of unchecked jury discretion to impose punitive damages.
For example, in Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust,34 the Court
observed:
Because juries are accorded broad discretion both as to the imposition and
amount of punitive damages, the impact of these windfall recoveries is unpre-
dictable and potentially substantial.13 5
Similarly, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,136 the Court noted that "ju-
ries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bear-
ing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused."137 In his
dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,138 Justice Mar-
shall commented that punitive damages,
[u]nlike criminal penalties .... are not awarded within discernible limits but
can be awarded in almost any amount .... [Tihese damages are the direct
product of the ancient theory of unlimited jury discretion .... The manner in
which unlimited discretion may be exercised is plainly unpredictable.1 3 9
Judges exercising essentially the same untrammeled discretion to
punish may be expected to produce the same arbitrary results. For
example, in Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.,140 a federal district
judge imposed a $500,000 punitive damage award against the defend-
ant for negligently mishandling an insurance claim. As Judge Jones
of the Fifth Circuit stated in her dissent from denial of an application
for rehearing en banc, "the fact finder possess[ed] unbridled discre-
tion to punish,"141 and this "punishment without moorings"'142 re-
133. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
concurring).
134. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
135. Id. at 50 (citations omitted). Cf Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2925 (O'Connor,
J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The threat of such
enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of new
products.").
136. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
137. Id. at 350.
138. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
139. Id. at 82-84 (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting) ("the essence of the
discretion is unpredictability and uncertainty"). See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 283 (1984) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Marshall, and Black-
mun, JJ. dissenting) ("It is not reasonable to infer that Congress[,] [through its legisla-
tion to regulate nuclear facilities,] intended to allow juries of lay persons, selected
essentially at random, to impose unfocused penalties solely for the purpose of punish-
ment and some undefined deterrence."); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453
U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981) ("The impact of such a windfall recovery is likely to be both
unpredictable and, at times, substantial"); In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1319-20
(9th Cir. 1980) (Kennedy, J.) (noting the "clearly noncompensatory purpose and the
serious and often unpredictable effects of allowing actions for punitive damages"), cert.
denied sub nom Kalinsky v. General Dynamics Corp., 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
140. 881 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3038 (U.S.
Feb. 13, 1990) (No. 89-1303).
141. Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1414, 1415 (5th Cir. 1990) (Jones,
J. dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
142. Id. at 16.
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sulted in an arbitrary punitive fine that violated the due process
clause.
It seems clear that principles of due process require that persons
who are subjected to potentially severe punishment be informed in
advance of at least the range of punishments available under applica-
ble law for specifically defined conduct. For example, the Supreme
Court has observed in the context of punishment imposed after crim-
inal proceedings that "vague sentencing provisions may pose constitu-
tional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the
consequences of violating a given criminal statute."'143 Thus, due pro-
cess requires that "the range of penalties" be specified in advance so
as to "inform] the courts, prosecutors, and defendants of the permis-
sible punishment alternatives available."144 Indeed, it is a basic prin-
ciple of our criminal law that the government can only prosecute a
person under a criminal statute that "fairly and clearly define[s] the
conduct made criminal and the punishment which can be
administered."145
As the Court observed in Gore v. United States,146 "views . . . re-
garding severity of punishment... are peculiarly questions of legisla-
tive policy."' 47 In most punitive damage cases, however, the
quintessentially legislative task148 of determining the punishment to
which an individual can be subjected is impermissibly delegated to
the jury and the trial court "for resolution on an ad hoc and subjec-
tive basis,"149 leading to arbitrary and unpredictable results.
It is no longer open to debate that punitive damages serve society's
penal goals and that "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of para-
mount importance."' 50 "The notion of punishment . . . cuts across
143. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979).
144. Id at 126.
145. Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1956) (Black, J., joined by Douglas,
J., dissenting). The due process requirement that a person of ordinary intelligence
have fair notice as to what the law commands or forbids is equally applicable in civil
proceedings. A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925) ("It
was not the criminal penalty that was held invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a
rule or standard which was so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard
at all."). See generally Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
146. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
147. Id. at 393. Accord Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 306 (1953) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) ("Congress and not the whim of the prosecutor fixes sentences.")
148. See United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 386-87 (1948); United States v.
Grimaud., 220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911). Cf United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,
32-34 (1812).
149. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
150. United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1901 & n.8 (1989).
the division between the civil and the criminal law ... .,"151 Due pro-
cess, at its core, means that "[t]he citizen cannot be held to answer
charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain
that they will reasonably admit of different constructions."15 2
The imposition of punitive damages inevitably involves the applica-
tion of uncertain and malleable standards to impose punishment in
capricious and unlimited amounts. The due process clause was in-
tended to protect citizens from either form of arbitrariness; it should
certainly restrain the imposition of both in a single remedy. 53
IV. CONCLUSION
The punitive damage phenomenon produces troubling distortions
in our civil justice systems by fostering unpredictable, capricious, and
anomalous results in civil litigation. These arbitrary and massive pu-
nitive windfalls have the cumulative effect of transforming our court-
houses into carnival casinos where punishments and rewards are
distributed seemingly at random. While the Supreme Court has ap-
parently concluded that the eighth amendment's prohibition of ex-
cessive governmental punishments does not restrain punitive
damages, the due process clause may yet be found to prohibit these
unlimited fines awarded for deviation from obscure and ineffable
standards.15 4
151. Id. at 1901.
152. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926).
153. Punitive damages raise other due process questions as well. For example, a
federal district court has recognized that the multiple imposition of punitive damages
for the same conduct (for example, in asbestos cases) is fundamentally unfair and may
violate the due process clause. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233,
1234-36 (D.N.J. 1989). In addition, a few states, such as Alabama, continue to permit
joint and several liability for punitive damages, a practice that can result in defendants
being punished in arbitrary and unlimited amounts, not only for their own misconduct,
but for the misconduct of others. See, e.g., Clardy v. Sanders, 551 So. 2d 1057, 1060-62
(Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 376 (1989). The Court long ago noted that "there is
no justice" in imposing joint liability for punitive damages. Washington Gas Light Co.
v. Landsden, 172 U.S. 534, 553 (1899).
154. On October 3, 1990, the Supreme Court heard argument in Pacific Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, No. 89-1279, which provides the Court with the opportunity to con-
sider these issues. The certiorari petition in Pacific Mutual presents the following
questions:
1. Whether Alabama Law, as applied below, violates Due Process by al-
lowing the jury to award punitive damages as a matter of "moral discretion,"
without adequate standards as to the amount necessary to punish and deter
and without a necessary relationship to the amount of actual harm caused.
2. Whether Alabama law violated Pacific Mutual's right to Due Process
under the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing punitive damages to be
awarded against it under a respondeat superior theory.
3. Whether the amount of punitive damages in this case was excessive, in vi-
olation of Pacific Mutual's Due Process right to be free of grossly excessive,
disproportionate damages awards.
4. Whether the suit below, although nominally civil, must be considered
criminal in nature as to the punitive damages awarded therein entitling Pa-
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cific Mutual to protection under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution.
5. Whether Alabama law discriminates against those defendants subjected to
open-ended punitive damages which may be awarded against other classes of
defendants, without rational basis.
6. Whether the constitutional defects in the award of punitive damages
against Pacific Mutual were cured by judicial review and the potential for a
remittur [sic].
Petition for Writ of Cert. at i, Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, (No. 89-1279).

